Thirty theological argument pileup

By the standard ontological argument we can see that God, the goodest gooder than which not one can be, exists. By using Ebonmuse’s Manichaean Reductio, we can just as well prove the existence of Negagod, the baddest badder than which not one, not even any politician, can be. God and Negagod are both omnipotent, omniscient, and several other omnis as well; but they are at the opposite ends of a moral spectrum.

Now the question rises of how that moral spectrum is defined: is it something basic in the structure of All, or just a whim?

If we assume it is a whim, that is, not inevitable and fixed, it must be either the whim of God, which is by that morality good, or the whim of Negagod, which is by that morality all evil and disgusting. As any morality-decreeing source clearly and universally declares itself good, the whim must be that of God. This, however, neglects the fact that God and Negagod, being reversed polarities, are in all things save morality equal: thus Negagod must have declared a morality as well; we may call this evil morality “malority” for ease of reference. Now, reasoning according to malority, Negagod is good, and God evil. The results are the reverse of but indistinguishable from those obtained through morality. Thus there is no such thing as fixed good or evil, just as assumed for this tine of the fork, and thus illustrated; and moreover each deed and its opposite are both both good and evil. As this is depressing, it cannot be; thus the other alternative is true. (See the note on the presuppositional argument below.)

Thus let us assume that morality is fixed, that is, not decreed by either God or Negagod. As we assume that morality is then a basic constant of the universe, we must turn to the origin of the universe for further illumination on the question of morality: and here the pertinent question is, which came first, God or Negagod?

Evolutionary chicken-related arguments will not be accepted here because they are elitistic, scientistic, reductionistic and materiarationalistisnistic.

The impeccable cosmological argument, a proper theological tool, shows that all things have their causes, and in the beginning of all must lie the first cause. Now this cause cannot be God or Negagod alone, for that would be symmetry breaking which is bad. Just likewise the first cause cannot be both God and Negagod, for that would assume co-operation, which would assume coincidence of moralities, which is absurd. Thus the first cause is neither God or Negagod, but a being we can call Ur-God; the first god, presumably the origin cause of God and Negagod as well.

Some readers may protest that this has gone too far, proving the existence of three separate gods already, with one of them being evil to boot, and another ambiguous on the matter; but to those readers we respond with the presuppositional argument, which says that if you disagree with us you’re incoherent and should not speak.

Now since we have two gods, God and Negagod, with moral desires, it is clear that they wish people to act according to those desires, and wish to reward those that do, and punish those that don’t. As they are equal in power, their equal strength in this either cancels out or results in dividing the world into two halves.

In the latter case, God holds dominion over the fates of one half of mankind, and Negagod over the other. In God’s domain those that do good go to Heaven, those that do evil go to Hell. In Negagod’s domain, the evildoers go to Negaheaven (presumably a nice place of rewards and rest), and the good-doers go to Negahell (a place of punishment; especially nasty as it is set up by a Supremely Evil God).

However, if the moral reward-desires of God and Negagod cancel each other out, being of equal but opposite intent and equal strength, neither God nor Negagod can reward humans for their thoughts or actions. But what about Ur-God? The preceding arguments have not established the moral character of Ur-God, except as far as noting that he is the prime cause of the universe, which has a universal moral law in it.

However, by the argument from design, that is, by observing the nature, we can deduce the character of Ur-God, for since God and Negagod are of equal and opposite character their effect on nature and man sums to zero, and the character of Ur-God decides. Even a cursory glance at the kingdoms of animals and plants shows a horrendous amount of cruelty, violence, pain and pure evil, and yet at the same glance immense amounts of grace, care, beauty, altruism and good. Thus we can say that by the evidence of the universe Ur-God is morally either indifferent (the balance of God and Negagod dominates) or then unstable (both good and evil are caused).

If Ur-God is morally indifferent, it has no will to reward or punish; and thus there is no Heaven or Hell of his device. This cannot be so. (The presuppositional argument. Only our view is coherent and possible.) If, on the other hand, he is unstable, he has moral desires, and consequently a Heaven and a Hell, but the criteria of entry are based on a blind whim, constantly changing as the winds of time blow. As this is the historically accurate view of Christian morality, we have thus shown not only the existence of a Christian God, but of two other gods as well!

* * *

(Masks of Eris: apologetics perverted and cats flattened while U wait.)

Also, the title “Thirty theological argument pileup” is echoed from Thirty Xanatos Pileup, courtesy of the most horrible timesuck on all of Internet, TV Tropes. Doesn’t hurt it’s so close to dirty theological argument pileup, either.

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